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Abstract
We discuss the proposal by Sebens and Carroll to derive the Born
rule in Everettian quantum mechanics from a principle they call ‘ESP-
QM.’ We argue that the proposal fails: ESP-QM is not, as Sebens and
Carroll argue, a ‘less general version’ of an independently plausible
principle ‘ESP’ and can only be motivated by the empirical success of
quantum mechanics, including use of the Born rule. Therefore, ESP-
QM cannot have the status of a meta-theoretical principle of reasoning
and provides no viable basis for deriving the Born rule.
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1 Introduction
Proponents of the Everett interpretation of quantum theory continue to
wrestle with the problem of justifying why rational agents in an Everett
world should use the Born Rule when assigning probabilities to measurement
outcomes. In the past few years, the most-discussed attempt to solve this
problem has been the decision-theoretic approach championed by Deutsch
and Wallace. Recently, Sebens and Carroll [2018] have argued for an epi-
stemic approach, which gives a very straightforward account of quantum
probabilities in terms of self-locating uncertainty in the Everettian ‘multi-
verse.’1 This approach is consistent with the way probability is conceived
as self-locating uncertainty in attempts to subject cosmological multiverse
theories to empirical tests.
Sebens and Carroll claim to have solved the probability problem in Ever-
ettian quantum theory by deriving from a principle that they call ‘ESP-QM’
1This general type of approach can be linked to (Vaidman [1998]).
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(where ‘ESP’ stands for ‘epistemic separability principle’) the result that
epistemic agents in the Everettian multiverse should align their self-locating
credences with the branch weights obtained from the Born rule. ESP-QM,
in turn, is motivated as the implementation, appropriate in the Everettian
quantum context, of a more general principle that Sebens and Carroll call
the Epistemic Separability Principle (ESP). ESP encodes the idea that an
agent’s rational self-locating analysis cannot depend on parts of the uni-
verse that are known to be entirely unrelated to her observations. This,
they argue, is an independently plausible assumption.
According to Sebens and Carroll, their result establishes that ‘the Born
rule is the uniquely rational way of apportioning credence in Everettian
quantum mechanics.’ (Sebens and Carroll [2018], abstract) Here we dis-
pute this claim by arguing that Sebens and Carroll misrepresent what is
accomplished by their derivation of the Born rule from ESP-QM. First, as
we argue, ESP-QM should not be regarded as the implementation of ESP
in the Everettian quantum context. There is no cogent step that leads from
ESP to ESP-QM in a quantum physical context. Quite to the contrary,
the rationale behind ESP may be taken to suggest self-locating credences
that are in general at variance with ESP-QM. Second, absent its ESP-based
motivation, the plausibility of ESP-QM depends entirely on the empirical
success of quantum mechanics – and therefore, indirectly, on assuming the
Born rule. There is no basis for viewing ESP-QM as an independently
attractive principle of rational reasoning. Establishing that the Born rule
can be derived from it does not solve the probability problem of Everettian
quantum theory.
2 Everettian branch structure and the epistemic
separability principle (ESP)
Everettian quantum mechanics can be viewed as a consistent and empirically
applicable scheme even in the absence of any explanation as to why the Born
rule prescribes the probability one should rationally assign to measurement
outcomes. It is consistent to add the Born rule as a primitive independent
rule to the dynamical equations of quantum mechanics.2 The Born rule
would in this case play the role of a recipe the physicist has to follow in or-
der to extract empirical predictions from Everettian quantum mechanics. It
would not represent a property of the world we aim to describe by Everettian
quantum mechanics. Nor would it follow from any characteristics of Ever-
2Since re-coherence effects render Everettian quantum mechanics empirically inequival-
ent to canonical quantum mechanics, Everettian quantum mechanics can be understood
as a physically distinct alternative to canonical quantum mechanics on a strictly empiricist
basis without any realist commitment to other branches. As Barrett [2011] points out,
Everett himself viewed his theory along these lines.
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ettian QM that represent properties of the world. This seems unsatisfactory
to many (though by no means all) physicists and philosophers of physics. A
number of proponents of Everettian QM have therefore aimed to explain the
Born rule in a way that is responsive to the ontic commitments of Everettian
quantum mechanics. Both the decision-theoretic programme championed by
Deutsch [1999] and Wallace [2012] and the proposal by Sebens and Carroll
fall into this category.
In order to put the idea proposed by Sebens and Carroll into context,
it is helpful to start with a brief look at the decision-theoretic approach.
According to Deutsch and Wallace, applying the Born rule is the only ra-
tional betting behavior open to an agent who endorses Everettian quantum
mechanics. In this decision-theoretic sense, Deutsch and Wallace argue, the
Born rule follows from Everettian quantum mechanics even though the Born
weights do not represent any kind of probability of existence. One conten-
tious aspect of this proposal is the need to introduce fairly specific and in
some cases controversial rationality conditions that determine what it takes
to bet rationally. One of those conditions is diachronic consistency, which
enforces that rational betting on the next measurement outcome must not
depend on the branching structure in that measurement’s future. Sebens
and Carroll reject diachronic consistency as a rationality criterion because,
as they convincingly argue, it is violated in perfectly consistent arguments
of self-location in well-defined multiverse setups.
Having rejected diachronic consistency, Sebens and Carroll suggest an
alternative strategy for motivating the Born rule. Their approach follows
Deutsch and Wallace in presupposing that a decoherent worlds structure
can be relied upon when extracting the Born rule from Everettian quantum
mechanics. This is itself a controversial assumption (see [Baker, 2007, Kent,
2010, Dawid and The´bault, 2015] for criticism), but we accept it for the
purposes of this note. The Born rule is then extracted based on analyzing
self-locating credences in an Everettian multiverse.
Sebens and Carroll start by introducing a general principle of rational
self-locating belief, which they call the epistemic separability principle (ESP).
The ‘gist’ of ESP is that ‘[t]he credence one should assign to being any one
of several observers having identical experiences is independent of the state
of the environment.’ [Sebens and Carroll, 2018, 40] In other words, accord-
ing to ESP an agent’s rational self-locating credences depend only on the
states of those subsystems S of the universe U that contain observers with
internally qualitatively identical states as the agent’s and not on the state
of the rest of U . The full formulation of ESP is:
ESP: Suppose that [the] universe U contains within it a set of
subsystems S such that every agent in an internally qualitatively
identical state to agent A is located in some subsystem which is
an element of S. The probability that A ought to assign to
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being located in a particular subsystem X ∈ S given that they
are in U is identical in any possible universe which also contains
subsystems S in the same exact states (and does not contain any
copies of the agent in an internally qualitatively identical state
that are not located in S). [Sebens and Carroll, 2018, 40]
P (X|U) = P (X|S) (1)
Here the conditional probability P (X|U) is to be understood as the self-
locating probability of being in subsystem X, given that one inhabits the
universe U . Similarly, P (X|S) is the self-locating probability of being in
the subsystem X, given that one inhabits one of the subsystems that are
elements of S, not knowing which. For the sake of the argument, we will, in
this paper, follow Sebens and Carroll in accepting ESP as a valid principle
of rational reasoning.
Sebens and Carroll then make the claim that the self-locating credences
of an epistemic agent in Everettian quantum theory conform to what they
take to be a quantum version of ESP, which they call ‘ESP-QM.’ That
principle states that the probability one should assign to being in a certain
branch of an Everettian multiverse does not depend on the full quantum
state Ψ of the universe, but only on the reduced density matrix ρˆAD that
describes the combined system of the agent A and the detector D:
ESP-QM: Suppose that an experiment has just measured observ-
able Oˆ of system S and registered some eigenvalue Oi on each
branch of the wave function. The probability that agent A ought
to assign to the detector D having registered Oi [in her branch]
when the universal wave function is Ψ, P (Oi|Ψ), only depends
on the reduced density matrix of A and D, ρˆAD:
P (Oi|Ψ) = P (Oi|ρˆAD) (2)
Using an argument idea adapted from [Zurek, 2005], Sebens and Carroll
show that ESP-QM entails the Born Rule as the uniquely correct prescrip-
tion for assigning self-locating probabilities. Since, according to them, ESP-
QM is the rational principle for assigning self-locating credences in Ever-
ettian quantum theory, they regard this result as solving the long-standing
probability problem of the Everett interpretation.
Sebens and Carroll argue their case for ESP-QM based on a specific
example of a quantum process, which they call the Once-or-Twice example.
In Once-or-Twice, Alice and Bob each have a spin-1/2 particle both of
which have been prepared in the x-spin up eigenstate. Alice measures spin
in z-direction of her particle without looking at the outcomes yet, but Bob
does look at the outcome and measures spin in x-direction of his particle
if the outcome of Alice’s measurement was +1/2. On Sebens and Carroll’s
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view of Everettian QM, branching occurs across the entire wave function if
and when Bob makes his measurement. Therefore, inasmuch as branches are
precisely defined, after Bob’s measurement there are two branches in which
Alice’s outcome is +1/2, but only one branch in which it is −1/2. Branch
counting3 thus recommends that Alice ascribe probability 2/3 to being in a
+1/2-branch, whereas the Born rule recommends ascribing probability 1/2.
Branch counting thus is at variance with the Born rule in the given case.
Sebens and Carroll now argue that ESP-QM is a ‘less general version of
ESP’ [Sebens and Carroll, 2018, p. 42] that can offer guidance as to what
should replace branch counting as the adequate strategy of extracting prob-
abilistic claims from Everettian quantum physics. The role of ESP was to
specify a universal independence assumption in a classical context. In a
quantum context, they argue, the core independence principle is related to
the reduced density matrix: if we consider a quantum experiment with out-
comes X and Y that is characterized by a given reduced density matrix, the
probability of being in branch X must be the same in any universe with that
same reduced density matrix. This implies that self-location probabilities on
Everettian branches must be independent of any part of the universe bey-
ond the reduced density matrix that describes a given quantum decision.
Therefore, Bob’s measurement cannot influence Alice’s assessment of the
probabilities of the outcomes of her measurement.
Sebens and Carroll argue that this point of view is in agreement with our
intuitions in the Alice case. The state (reduced density operator ρAD) of the
Alice + Detector system is unchanged when Bob performs his measurement
on the branch in which the spin in x-direction of Alice’s particle is +1/2.
They suggest that it seems highly counter-intuitive to assume that Alice’s
probability assessments should change due to an event that does not change
the state of the Alice + Detector system.
Sebens and Carroll conclude that ESP-QM is the appropriate implement-
ation of ESP in the quantum context that can provide a basis for deducing
the Born rule once the truth of Everettian QM is assumed.
3 Why ESP-QM is not ‘a less general version of
ESP’
Sebens and Carroll’s line of reasoning relies on two assertions. First, they
state that ESP-QM is a ‘less general version of ESP’, which allows them
to use the plausibility of ESP as a reason for endorsing ESP-QM in the
case of quantum processes. Second, they assert that ESP-QM as a principle
of self-location has the character of a general principle of reasoning and
3Branch counting means identifying and counting the decohered branches of the wave
function and aligning one’s self-locating credence about being in a branch with a particular
property with the ratio of branches with that property.
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thus amounts to more than a specific physical posit that needs to be added
to Everettian QM for the sake of empirical adequacy. If ESP-QM simply
amounted to a physical posit, Sebens and Carroll’s claim that the Born rule
can be deduced from ESP-QM based on Everettian QM would deflate to
the unsurprising statement that the Born rule can be added to Everettian
QM as an additional posit. In the following we will contest both of these
assertions.
Let us start the analysis by looking at the way ESP plays out in Once-or-
Twice in a little more detail. We consider the situation both before and after
Bob makes his measurement. At t2, immediately after Alice’s measurement
but before Bob’s, the universal wave function Ψ(t2) is given by
Ψ(t2) = 1/
√
2ψAD,+ χ+ 1/
√
2ψAD,− χ . (3)
where ψAD,+ and ψAD,− are the states of the Alice + Detector system before
Alice’s registering the measured result in the different branches, and the
state χ describes the rest of the universe, including Bob before making his
measurement (see Eq. (7) in Sebens and Carroll [2018] for more complete
decompositions of Ψ at all times).
Next, at t3, after Bob’s measurement but prior to Alice’s looking at her
measurement outcome, the universal wave function is
Ψ(t3) = 1/2ψAD,+ χ+,+ + 1/2ψAD,+ χ+,− + 1/
√
2ψAD,− χ−,x . (4)
where the states χ+,+, χ+,−, and χ−,x are the associated states of the rest
of the universe including Bob.
At t2, the self-locating problem for Alice is most naturally construed
as concerning the system S that consists of her copies in the two branches
corresponding to the two states ψAD,+ and ψAD,−. Now, for ESP to have
any specific implications for the transition from t2 to t3, one would have to
make sure that, at t3, the system with respect to whose subsystems Alice has
self-locating uncertainty is still the same S. If not, the self-location problem
at t3 concerns a different set S
′ and ESP provides no basis for comparing
self-location credences before and after Bob’s measurement.
We will now make three points which demonstrate in conjunction how
what Sebens and Carroll have accomplished fails to solve the probability
problem for Everettian quantum theory.
1: ESP-QM is not a systematically preferred Everettian quantum
version of ESP.
ESP takes the form of ESP-QM if one identifies the ‘set of subsystems S’
that appears in ESP with the system’s reduced density matrix ρred, which is
obtained from the total global quantum state by performing the trace over
the degrees of freedom of all other systems. Sebens and Carroll motivate this
move in an appendix to the paper. There they appeal to the requirement for
considering something to be the state of a subsystem of the universe that it
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should (i) together with the states of all other subsystems and
facts about the connections between the subsystems, yield the
total state, and (ii) be sufficient to determine its own evolution
when the subsystem is isolated. [Sebens and Carroll, 2018, 67]
In a further argumentative step, Sebens and Carroll argue that the reduced
density matrix satisfies this criterion: facts about how the subsystem state
is entangled with the state of the rest of the universe are attributed to
how those states are ‘connected.’ But even if one accepts both the stated
requirement and the claim that the reduced density matrix satisfies it, one
can still question, as Sebens and Carroll acknowledge, whether it does so
uniquely. Notably in the context of Everettian QM one may prefer a notion
of physical subsystem state which includes information about whether the
system undergoes branching. The reduced density matrix does not in general
do that. As we argue in what follows, this makes it an odd candidate for
representing (the complete states of) subsystems S in ESP-like reasoning in
the context of Everettian QM.
2: Based on the rationale behind ESP, one can motivate self-
locating credences in Everettian QM that are generally in conflict
with ESP-QM.
Sebens and Carroll endorse a conception of Everettian branching ac-
cording to which ‘branching happens throughout the whole wave function’
[Sebens and Carroll, 2018, 34] whenever it happens.4 As they explain, this
conception entails that ‘[t]he change from t2 to t3 in Once-or-Twice increases
the number of copies of Alice in existence’ [Sebens and Carroll, 2018, p. 46].
Presumably, this increase in the number of copies of Alice corresponds to a
physical change in the Alice + Detector system. Since the reduced density
matrix ρAD of the Alice + Detector system does not change, this conception
is in tension with the idea—underlying ESP-QM—that the reduced density
matrix is to be regarded as the physical state of a system.
Worse, regarding the increase of copies of Alice in existence as irrelev-
ant to Alice’s rational self-locating credences conflicts with the motivation
that Sebens and Carroll themselves give for ESP in the first place. In their
considerations on the Dr. Evil scenario they acknowledge that Dr. Evil’s
self-locating credences may reasonably change ‘if what’s happening on Nep-
tune includes another copy of the laboratory with another duplicate Dr.
Evil in it. If there’s a duplicate on Neptune, Dr. Evil can no longer be sure
that Neptune is in fact a distant planet and not the one under his feet (and
thus cannot treat it as irrelevant to his probability assignments).’ Now, if
the Dr. Evil scenario is in any way relevant as an analogy to Once-or-Twice,
4This view has been criticised in (McQueen and Vaidman [2019]) as implausible. But
we adopt it in this paper in order to demonstrate a more general problem the approach
by Sebens and Carroll faces even if one concedes them this assumption.
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as Sebens and Carroll, clearly suggest, it seems obvious to suggest that an
analogous duplication process, with analogous consequences for rational self-
locating credences, occurs and affects Alice when she undergoes Everettian
branching as a result of Bob’s measurement at t3. But this means that
the set S of subsystems with respect to which Alice has self-locating uncer-
tainty changes at t3 to some S
′ 6= S. ESP by itself thus does not sanction
the verdict—which indeed follows from ESP-QM—that Bob’s measurement
has no effect on Alice’s rational self-locating credences. By the standards
of the rationale behind ESP, as provided by Sebens and Carroll themselves,
the ESP-QM-based verdicts are not in general plausible.
Since ESP does not specify the way in which self-location within the new
system S′ must be carried out, it does not rule out that Alice’s self-locating
credences in Once-or-Twice are the same at t2 and t3. ESP by itself is simply
silent with respect to whether Alice’s credences should change after Bob’s
measurement. It does not strictly speaking determine whether Alice must
rely on branch counting (inasmuch as defined) or the Born rule or some
other strategy when assigning her self-locating credences.5. But in view of
the motivation that Sebens and Carroll themselves give for adopting ESP,
the recommendations issued based on ESP-QM do not in general appear to
be a natural choice.
According to points 1 and 2, ESP-QM is neither a less general version
of ESP nor a replacement of ESP in an Everettian context. In fact, the
two principles have different types of implications for rational self-location
in Everettian QM. ESP imposes constraints on self-locating credences in
situations that agree on the system S with respect to whose subsystems
self-locating credences are assigned; but it remains silent with respect to
the specific probabilistic weights attributed to any subsystem of S (be they
agents on different branches or on one and the same branch). ESP-QM,
to the contrary, remains silent about self-location on one branch but does
specify rational credences to be assigned to agents on different branches,
stating that they correspond to the Born weights of branches. Therefore,
most implications of ESP-QM are not implications of ESP and most im-
plications of ESP are not implications of ESP-QM. ESP-QM is simply an
entirely different principle than ESP.
3: ESP-QM has no independent motivation as a principle of
self-location in Everettian QM beside the fact that the Born rule
can be extracted from it.
With the idea of regarding ESP-QM as a ‘less general version of ESP’ off
the table, there could still be another, independent, motivation for ESP-QM
5Sebens and Carroll acknowledge this point. In cases where they want to adhere to
the principle of indifference, they appeal to a variant of ESP that they call ‘Strong ESP’
[Sebens and Carroll, 2018, 48], which entails that ESP reduces to self-locating indifference
when applied to within-branch self-locating uncertainty
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as a principle of rational self-locating credences in Everettian QM.
Sebens and Carroll offer a second argument for the principle’s cogency
by pointing out that endorsing the principle seems to be the only way of
getting self-location probabilities off the ground in Everettian QM, since
branch identities are fuzzy and branch counting appears to be conceptually
impossible. But even if one is willing to concede that no other prescriptions
for assigning self-locating beliefs to branches can be coherently formulated,
this does not establish ESP-QM as a principle of reasoning.
Whether or not a theory allows for the the extraction of self locating
probabilities, probabilities of measurement oucomes, or other relevant fea-
tures, depends on that theory’s conceptual structure. If a theory fails to
provide such desired kinds of information, this may be a reason for repla-
cing the given theory by an alternative that does the job. If it is possible
to extend the given theory in a way that provides the desired kinds of in-
formation, such an extension may be a way to go. In the case of Everettian
QM, as discussed above, adding the Born rule to the theory as a primitive
rule would be a step of this kind. The described process fully plays out at
the level of scientific theory building.
There is no basis, however, for invoking a new principle of reasoning
for the mere reason that such a principle would increase a given theory’s
range of analytic implications or its predictive power. Any attempt to do
so indicates a misunderstanding of the relation between a scientific theory
and principles of reasoning. In the final Section, we will have a closer look
at this issue.
4 What is a principle of reasoning?
Adherents of a ‘rationality principle’ approach to Everettian QM, such as
Deutsch and Wallace or Sebens and Carroll, acknowledge that Everettian
QM does not allow for the deduction of objective probabilities of measure-
ment outcomes. Moreover, they feel discontent with simply introducing the
Born rule as a primitive instrumentalist principle. The proposed way out is
to open up the additional playing field of requirements of rational reasoning
in the given context. Those requirements are then claimed to enforce the
application of the Born rule once one assumes that Everettian QM is true.
While Deutsch and Wallace focus on rational betting, Sebens and Carroll
focus on principles of self-locating reasoning.
The proposed principles of rational reasoning have a peculiar status. On
the one hand, they obviously cannot be strictly analytic. If they were, imple-
menting them in the given case would simply amount to logically deducing
the Born rule from the Everettian branching structure. As just pointed out,
the proponents of those principles agree that this is not possible. Sebens
and Carroll explicitly call their principles ‘epistemic.’
9
On the other hand, the requirements cannot be contained in the set of
posits that define the theory of Everettian QM. Otherwise endorsing the
principles would amount to introducing the Born rule as a primitive posit
in the theory, which is not what exponents of the ‘rationality principle’
approach want to do.
When Sebens and Carroll suggest that the described extra-theoretical
non-analytic criteria should be established in the context of self-location
on Everettian branches, they can refer to the parallel case of self-location
in a cosmic multiverse, where an equivalent role of general principles of
reasoning is widely (though not universally) acknowledged. In the latter
case, a cosmological theory T asserts a certain structure of the universe.
Based on T, general principles such as the principle of indifference or ESP
tell us how we should assess the probability that we sit in a given corner
of the universe. Those principles are indeed neither analytic principles nor
strictly implied by the cosmological theory T. So, in the context of the
cosmological multiverse, they do play the role envisioned by Sebens and
Carroll.
Sebens and Carroll can also rightfully argue that the principle of in-
difference must fail as a general principle of self-location in an Everettian
context: it is inapplicable due to the impossibility of branch counting in a
full Everettian branching structure. Sebens and Carroll can thus plausibly
claim that ESP, which does not face this problem, should be kept and the
principle of indifference should be abandoned when analysing Everettian
branches. But this does not amount to a solution of the probability prob-
lem since, as spelled out in the previous section, ESP does not dictate any
assignment of self-locating probabilities in concrete quantum scenarios like
Once-or-Twice.
But, as we have seen in the previous section, there is just no way to
motivate ESP-QM, which prescribes specific credences, from ESP, which
does no such thing. Of course one still has the option to simply propose
ESP-QM as a new principle of self-location that is specifically tailored to
the context of Everettian quantum physics. However, introducing a new
principle in that way is an entirely different conceptual move than appealing
to an independently motivated general principle of reasoning such as ESP
or the principle of indifference and motivating ESP-QM from there.
Principles like indifference or ESP work in the context of cosmology
based on our general understanding that their application gives satisfactory
results in a wide range of contexts that include the analysis of that theory’s
implications but are by no means confined to the context of the given cos-
mological theory. Their validity as general principles of self-location that
can be applied ‘from the outside’ when analysing a scientific theory’s im-
plications crucially relies on the fact that they are not licensed exclusively
by that same scientific theory.
ESP-QM cannot possibly meet this condition. It emerges in a specific
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theoretical context where one general principle of reasoning, the principle of
indifference, is in general inapplicable. Any principle that replaces it must
be extracted from the very theoretical context that rendered the principle of
indifference obsolete. Therefore, the new principle cannot be a general prin-
ciple of reasoning of the kind exemplified by indifference or ESP. Rather, it
is a principle that gets extracted from the theory itself. Since, as discussed
above, the connection between Born weights and self-location does not fol-
low from Everettian branching structure itself, ESP-QM thus can only be
established once the posit of the Born rule has been assumed as a primitive
principle of Everettian QM.
So, given that ESP-QM cannot be acknowledged as a principle of reas-
oning, what status could be attributed to it? ESP-QM does formally reach
beyond the simple posit of the Born rule: it spells out how probabilities
of self-location in Everettian branches would have to be specified in agree-
ment with the Born rule. If a realist view of Everettian branches that was
consistent with the Born rule could be developed, ESP-QM would describe
the self-locating aspect of such a realist interpretation. But ESP-QM it-
self does not provide such a realist interpretation because it addresses only
prescriptions for an agent’s credences rather than the physical world itself.
As long as the Born rule is merely introduced as a primitive rule, how-
ever, which, as suggested earlier in this paper, enforces an instrumentalist
take on Everettian QM, ESP-QM merely amounts to a formal excercise. It
defines a formal property called ‘self-location probability’ that couches the
Born rule in the terminology of self-location but lacks any physical or realist
significance.
Either way, Sebens and Carroll’s discussion of ESP and their derivation
of the Born rule from ESP-QM, while stimulating and illuminating, does
not resolve the probability problem for Everettian quantum theory.
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